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Abstract 
 
This paper surveys the phenomenal transformation of banking and finance, public debt and monetary 
regimes during 1900-1937, a period of great political instability in Chinese history. To understand why 
sectors which are often most vulnerable to the security of property rights and contract enforcement, 
have become the vanguard of growth in such an era of uncertainty, I highlight the role of institutions as 
seen in the form of a business dominated quasi-political structure that grew outside the formal political 
sphere. This structure rested on the institutional nexus of Western treaty ports (with Shanghai being the 
important) and China Maritime Customs service, a relatively autonomous tax bureaucracy. By ensuring 
the credibility of repayment of government bonds, this financial-fiscal mechanism laid the institutional 
foundation for the rise of modern Chinese banks, a viable market for public debt and increasing supply 
of reputable convertible bank notes during this era of national dis-integration. My narrative carries far-
reaching implications on the ongoing great divergence debate.  
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The Rise of a Financial Revolution in Republican China in 1900-1937: an 
Institutional Narrative  
 
 
Abstract: This paper surveys the phenomenal transformation of banking and finance, public debt and 
monetary regimes during 1900-1937, a period of great political instability in Chinese history. To 
understand why sectors which are often most vulnerable to the security of property rights and contract 
enforcement, have become the vanguard of growth in such an era of uncertainty, I highlight the role of 
institutions as seen in the form of a business dominated quasi-political structure that grew outside the 
formal political sphere. This structure rested on the institutional nexus of Western treaty ports (with 
Shanghai being the important) and China Maritime Customs service, a relatively autonomous tax 
bureaucracy. By ensuring the credibility of repayment of government bonds, this financial-fiscal 
mechanism laid the institutional foundation for the rise of modern Chinese banks, a viable market for 
public debt and increasing supply of reputable convertible bank notes during this era of national dis-
integration. Our narrative carries far-reaching implications on the ongoing great divergence debate.  
 
 
The period of 1900-1937 straddles several sub-periods of a tumultuous era in modern Chinese 
history. It starts disastrously with Qing’s calamitous military defeat by Western (and Japanese) 
allied forces over the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901. In the wake of this defeat, 
Qing embarked on a bold modernization reform in 1905, modelled after Japan’s Meiji 
Restoration, but only to collapse in 1911. China’s subsequent Republican era (1911-1949) 
begins with the Beiyang decades of 1911-27 – also better known now as the Warlord era - 
ruled by the so-called Northern regime in Beijing. It is followed by the Nanjing era led by the 
Nationalist government based in the capital city of Nanjing in 1928, only to be disrupted by a 
full scale Japanese invasion in 1937. The era saw perhaps China’s best and worst of times. It 
had China’s first ever – if not the last - genuine experiment with Parliamentary 
Constitutionalism, a recurring political theme both championed and reprimanded today in 
China. This was an age of unprecedented openness, the origin of modernity and liberalism, 
and the beginning of modern economic growth. But for many, it is remembered for its 
political dis-order, economic dislocation, and profound national weakness and humiliation at 
the hands of Western imperialism and later Japanese invasion.  
This paper offers a survey and assessment on the economic performance of this 
complex period but with a focus on the banking and finance, public debt and monetary 
regimes which have seen the most phenomenal transformation. In particular, I aim to explain 
the puzzle why sectors such as modern banking, which are often most vulnerable to the 
security of property rights and contract enforcement, have become the vanguard of growth 
during this era of political turmoil and pervasive uncertainty.   
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An enduring enigma in Chinese economic history in the context of the Great 
Divergence debate is the relative under-development of formal banking institutions and 
financial markets particularly for public debt even in China’s most dynamic or stable periods.1 
This enigma can be linked to the so-called credible commitment problem in the political 
science literature: a government strong enough to definite and protect property rights is also 
strong enough to abrogate them for its own benefit. One possible solution to overcome this 
problem in the setting of a strong despot is that of a stationary banditry equilibrium where a 
stable ruler with long time horizon will protect property rights and enforce contracts for his 
own self-interest of staying in power. Given imperial China’s earlier consolidation and longer 
duration of the centralized and absolutist political rule with undisputed property rights over 
people and properties, the stationary banditry equilibrium is of particular relevance.
2
  
In the early 20
th
 century, a landmark constitutional reform which aimed at reforming 
the shortfalls of the traditional polity took off in China but with its unintended and 
undesirable consequence of setting her on a path of disintegration and disorder. So, 
throughout the first decades of the 20
th
 century, the Republican China was engulfed by the 
reverse of the credible commitment problem: the government simply became too weak to 
provide normal social order let alone implement real institutional reform. Hence, the rise of 
modern banking and financial market especially for governmental debt offers a fascinating 
case study. I argue that it was precisely the temporal retreat of a centralized imperial power in 
China that allowed the rise of a quasi-political structure dominated by business elites. This 
structure rested on the institutional nexus of Western treaty ports (with Shanghai being the 
largest and most notable) and Maritime Customs service, perhaps China’s first modern and 
independent civil and tax bureaucracy. The key feature was a financial-fiscal mechanism that 
ensured the credibility of repayment of government bonds and offered a substitute form of 
commitment to property rights and contract enforcement.
 3
 Both these institutions were all 
intimately connected with Western imperialism and privileges but ultimately were utilized 
and borrowed by Chinese merchant elites and some enlightened government bureaucrats to 
lay the institutional foundation for the rise of modern Chinese banks based on a free-banking 
system, a viable market for public debt, a silver standard increasingly unified under a regime 
                                                 
1
 See Brandt-Ma-Rawski 2011 for a survey on the Great Divergence debate on when and why China 
was falling behind Western Europe in the early modern era.   
2
 For a good discussion on the theoretical framework of the credible commitment problem, see the 
Introductory chapter to Haber, Razo and Maurer 2003. See Ma 2012 for an exposition on the historical 
evolution of traditional Chinese political regime in the stationary banditry framework. 
3
 See North and Weingast (1989) for the well-known case of Glorious Revolution in 1688 where a 
constitutional arrangement that placed parliamentary checks on the executive power of the English 
Crown and in turned provided credible commitment. Also see Stasavage 2016 for a survey on the 
institutional conditions for the emergence of sovereign debt in Western Europe.  
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of national coinage and increasing supply of liquidity in the form of private convertible bank 
notes during this era of national dis-integration.  
The rise and fall of this quasi-structure in China during this unique era mimicked the 
European experience of autonomous city-states as the pioneers of financial innovation. It is 
consistent with David Stasavage’s recent survey (2016) on the connection between the 
emergence of sovereign debt and rise of autonomous cities in Western Europe politically 
dominated by merchant elites. Hence my survey here shows that a stationary banditry in the 
case of a highly centralized Chinese imperial polity, while not necessarily posing a serious 
impediment to small-scale informal financial institutions, may explain the absence or 
underdevelopment of large and visible formal financial organizations and markets.
 
 This 
carries far-reaching implications on the ongoing Great Divergence debate.  
I divide my survey into three sections followed by a conclusion. The first section 
provides a brief survey of historical background and economic record for this era. The second 
section narrates the rise of the Shanghai International Settlement and Chinese banking 
community. The third section focuses on Chinese Maritime Customs, public debt and 
monetary transformation in this period. 
 
1. China in 1900-1936: Historical Background and Economic Performance 
The onset of Western imperialism in mid-19th century represented a watershed in Chinese 
history, challenging the economic, political, institutional, and ideological underpinnings of 
the Qing empire. Western imperialism never subjugated China to full colonization but 
manifested itself as a series of trading rights, leased territories, treaty ports with 
extraterritoriality (for foreign business and residents) or spheres of interest in China in the 19-
20
th
 centuries. The late-Qing governmental response in the second half of the 19th century was 
relatively conservative and limited to mostly the modernization of Chinese military through a 
series of government financed or controlled Western style, capital-intensive industrial 
enterprises under the banner of Self-strengthening movement (1860-1894). Meanwhile, little 
was done to support the private sector or promote key modern public infrastructures such as 
modern railroads and steam shipping in inland waters in the 19th century (Brandt Ma Rawski, 
2011).  
The 1894-96 naval confrontation between China and Japan became a turning point.  
China’s defeat by a nation long regarded as her one-time student brought a profound mental 
shock that spelled the end of the Self-strengthening movement and opened the path towards a 
late-Qing constitutional reform during 1903-11 modeled directly after Japan’s more 
comprehensive Meiji reform.  The constitutional reform recognized the centrality of the 
private sector to a market economy and paved the way for the introduction of modern public 
infrastructure. But reform was as short-lived as the final years of the empire, which collapsed 
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in 1911.  What ensured in the following two decades defy simple classification as there have 
been at least two political regimes and three different eras: the Northern regime (1911-1925), 
the period of Northern expedition (1925-27) and the Nanjing regime (1927-37). National 
disintegration and civil strife seemed to have become the norm of the eras with no single 
government having effective control over the whole of China during the Republican era 
(Sheridan 1983, Nathan 1976, Waldron 1995).  But the Northern regime, at least until 1923, 
experimented with China’s first ever parliamentary democracy and flirted with the idea of 
Federalism, something fundamentally antithetical to traditional Chinese political tradition of 
centralization.4 In that sense, China, as eloquently argued by Frank Dikotter (2010), has never 
seen an era as her Republican era, not just in borders and trade, but also in governance and 
minds. Despite the weakened or even at times dysfunctional political rule, China’s so-called 
Warlord era made great strides in legal reform, upheld the ideal of constitutionalism and 
achieved admirable diplomatic success in the international arena. There was also greater 
scope for political experimentation, for the strengthening of local governance, flourishing of 
civil societies, of free and independent academic and intellectual institutions.   
But parliamentary politics Chinese style may also be a recipe for chaos marked by the 
constant shuffle of governmental cabinets, scandalous vote-rigging and corruption (Nathan 
1976, Waldron 1995).  With political disintegration, Warlords of different persuasions or 
fractions brought different degrees of terror and exploitation, through fiscal extraction, the 
printing of worthless currencies, the kidnapping of rich merchants or prey on the hapless 
peasantry.  According to one estimate, there were some 140 wars fought among a total of 
more than 1,300 rival militarists between 1911 and 1928.  Even those who pointed out the 
limited extent of warfare damage and existence of enlightened and stable warlords who 
promoted economic reforms in their territories would have to agree that political unrest and 
civil wars made any long-range investment extremely precarious (Rawski 1989, Sheridan 
1983 and Ma 2008).  Arthur Waldron (1995) noted a progressive scaling-up of military 
warfare that were spilling over to China’s most productive regions or even treaty ports under 
foreign jurisdiction where wealth was concentrated. In the Lower Yangzi, the least war-torn 
area, the war between the rival Jiangsu and Zhejiang warlords in 1924 led to massive forced 
requisition of civilian personnel and services, confiscation of private properties, extortion of 
merchants and business, and severe disruptions of production and trade, inflicting huge 
economic losses.  
Out of these contradictory developments emerged something near to a growth 
“miracle”.  The initial impetus may have come from the signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki 
in 1896 after China’s naval defeat by Japan. The treaty granted foreigners the right to 
                                                 
4  See Ma 2012 for a framework on the traditional political system in China.   
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establish factories in the treaty port which opened the floodgate of foreign direct investment 
in China and indirectly legitimized Chinese modern enterprises. Along with the onset of WWI 
which led to a temporary withdrawal of Western industrial competition, they set off the first 
major wave of Chinese industrialization.  Activity in mining and manufacturing accelerated 
sharply from its small initial base from the end of the 19
th
 century, making average nominal 
annual industrial investment by Chinese nationals in 1914-1925 11 times that of the 1840-
1911 (Ma 2008).  Despite the importance of foreign investment in Shanghai and especially in 
Manchuria, Chinese-owned companies produced 73 percent of China’s 1933 factory output 
(Brandt et al 2014).  Overall industrial output growth showed double-digit real annual growth 
during 1912-1936 (Ma 2008). External trade also boomed, rising to a peak of more than two 
percent of global trade flows in the late 1920s (a level that was not regained until the 1990s).  
Industrialization led to import substitution and rising product diversity in both internal and 
external trades (Mitchener and Yan, forthcoming, Wolfgang, Li and Shiue 2012). Meanwhile, 
public infrastructure improved with China’s railway network growing from a paltry 364 
kilometers in 1894 to over 21,000 by 1937 (Brandt et al 2014).
 5
  The puzzle of economic 
growth in this era has been extensively explored and surveyed elsewhere (Rawski 1989, Ma 
2008, Brandt et al 2012). Below, I turn to examine the institutional mechanism for the rise of 
modern banking and finance which is most sensitive to political institution and contract 
enforcement mechanism.
6
   
 
2. Shanghai International Settlement and the Chinese Bankers  
Shanghai was one of the five designated treaty ports opened up by the treaty of Nanjing 
signed after the First Opium War of 1842. It grew from a modest market town into a major 
city under separate jurisdictions of British, French and American Concessions as well as 
Chinese quarters.  In 1863, the British concession merged with the American quarters to form 
the International Settlement for all Western (and later Japanese) residents while the French 
Concession remained separate throughout. The governance structure of the Settlement 
followed that of a Medieval European type of incorporated urban communities where 
merchant elites practiced self-rule often with charters granted by larger territorial rulers. From 
its very early days, the Western merchant elites of the Settlement had desired and fought for 
                                                 
5
 Question remains on how much of these impressive achievements in the modern sectors and in major 
coastal urban centers translate into nationwide improvements. Given the dominant share of agriculture 
in GDP, national growth rates are less sanguine: even the most optimistic re-assessment of per capita 
GDP estimates only yielded real annual per capita GDP growth rate no higher than 2% between 1911 
and 1936, a respectable but not spectacular rate by the standards of the time. See Rawski 1989, Ma 
2008 and See Richardson 1999. Some recent work by Baten et al (2010) do point to an uptick in 
welfare in the first three decades of the 20
th
 century using indicators such as height and age-heaping (a 
proxy for numeracy and literacy).   
6 For the large question on economic growth and political instability, see Haber et al 2003 for the case 
of Mexico, Latin America. See Bates 2004 for the relevance of this issue to Africa.   
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self-rule against direct administrative rule from the far-flung Imperial capital.7  
 The Settlement organized a Municipal Council whose members were elected by the rate-
payers association that consisted of tax-paying Westerners in the Settlement.  It operated with 
its own mini-Constitution: the Shanghai Land Regulations signed with the local Chinese 
authority in 1854 and subsequently revised in 1866. It Judicial powers over foreign residents 
were, under the grant of extraterritoriality, vested in the Consular Courts of the foreigners 
concerned, or, in the case of unrepresented foreigners or Chinese, in the International Mixed 
Court. The Municipal Council had a right to sue in these courts, and could in turn be sued in a 
court elected from the Consuls of the Treaty Powers, known as the Court of Consuls.  As a 
general rule, the Council could make no arrests except on a warrant of the proper court.  This 
institutional structure placed the Settlement on a foundation of limited power and rule of law.  
The Municipal Council levied land and property taxes and business license fees, ran its own 
prison and police squad with the additional support of a volunteer army in times of need.  In 
comparison with the Chinese quarter governed by the local Qing government, business-
dominated Council was far more efficient in the provision of public goods (or semi-public 
goods) ranging from the maintenance and improvement of city roads, transportation and 
communication infrastructures, public utilities and port facilities.8   
The critical phases of growth in the Shanghai International Settlement are intricately 
linked with major political turmoil within China. The first phase occurred in 1853 when the 
attack and occupation of the Chinese territory in Shanghai by the so-called Small Sword 
Society – a branch of the devastating Taiping Rebels – pushed massive number of Chinese 
refuges into the shelter of the International Settlement and French concession protected by 
their extraterritoriality. The influx of Chinese residents followed by Chinese business, wealth 
and entrepreneurship set off a boom to the Shanghai real estate. The outcome is that Chinese 
formed the overwhelming majority of residents in the Settlement and paid bulk of the taxes 
but without any formal representation on the Municipal Council until 1928 (Ma 2011, Isabella 
Jackson forthcoming 2016).  
The second critical phase of the Settlement came in 1911 when Qing collapsed. Taking 
advantage of China’s political weakness, both the International Settlement and the French 
Concession made their greatest territorial expansion to reach 33 square kilometers, 1.5 times 
the total size of foreign concessions in the other 23 treaty ports in China.  When the Qing 
magistrate in Shanghai absconded during the 1911 revolution, the International Settlement 
                                                 
7 This is an institutional feature that distinguished from most other treaty ports in China or even the 
neighboring French Concession, which had been under the administrative rule of the French consular 
appointed from Paris. For details, see Ma 2011.  
8
 See Ma 2011 and especially Jackson forthcoming 2016, Fan Guo 2012, Yang Xiaoyan 2014 on the 
inner working of the Municipal Council.    
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took over the Mixed Court and began to appoint its own Chinese legal personnel.  By then, 
the Settlement became a de-facto city-state with full territorial jurisdiction over all its 
residents, Western or Chinese (Ma 2011). The work by Thomas Stephens on the Mixed Court 
in 1911-1925 led him to emphatically state that “throughout all the political vicissitudes of the 
Yuan Shikai era…, throughout all the marching and countermarching of the armies of the 
warlords and their murdering marauding hordes, … Shanghai remained an oasis of peace, 
order and good government in a China torn into convulsions by revolution, banditry and civil 
war (Stephens 1992, pp. 104-6). The 1911-1925 period would mark the heyday of Shanghai 
and the Settlement. Overall, the population of Shanghai doubled from only half a million in 
the 1890s, to over a million in the 1910s, and to about 3.5 million in the 1930s.
9
  
Beyond security and order, the institutional model of the International Settlement has 
exerted a profound and lasting impact on political organization, legal regime of property 
rights and contract enforcement, fiscal structure and civil societies.  By taking advantage of 
the freedom of association and rule of law there, the Chinese merchant elites turned 
geographic space of the Settlement into a critical staging ground to reproduce the model of 
Western style mercantile city-state on China’s “extra-territory” in spite of their complete 
absence of representation on the Municipal Council. Among the most important groups in 
finance are the Shanghai Bankers’ Association and Shanghai Native Bankers Association 
which expanded rapidly from the 1910s in the wake of Qing’s collapse. They coordinated 
collective action, lobbied the Municipal Council, Chinese government and other formal public 
institutions and disseminated economic information and financial statistics through the 
publication of professional journals and newspapers.10 
The Shanghai Native Bankers Association whose origin could be traced to the 18
th
 century 
made a major expansion in its new location in the Settlement in 1917. The Native Bankers 
have long been the regulator of the traditional monetary standards in the domestic market, 
which was a bewildering mixture of silver bullion, foreign silver coins (imported mostly from 
South America), government minted Chinese copper cash along with some private notes.  
Native banks are the major financial intermediaries of domestic long-distance in agricultural 
goods throughout China and use their vast network to transfer bills, notes and silver dollars 
across major trading centers.  They regulated Shanghai tael, an abstract unit of silver ingot 
defined by weight, purity and fineness and publicized daily exchange rates of tael versus 
                                                 
9 By the 1930s, Shanghai alone produced 41% of national manufacturing output (48% if excluding 
Manchuria), absorbed 46.4% of total FDI in China and 67% of FDI in manufacturing and claimed 
47.8% of China’s financial capital.  With more than half of China’s foreign trade and one fifth of the 
Chinese shipping tonnage sailed through her harbor. Shanghai was the commercial, financial and 
industrial city of China in the early 20th century, see Ma 2008. 
10 See Du 2006 for a detailed and insightful study of Shanghai Native Bankers’ Association.  
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silver dollars, which reflected short term market demand for silver dollar as a medium of 
exchange anchored on the intrinsic value of the silver tael.
11
  
The Shanghai Native Bankers Association played a crucial role in the promotion and 
diffusion of a Chinese version of silver dollar, minted first by the Beijing government in 1914. 
In 1916, the Association made a major move to use domestically minted coins - mainly the 
so-called Yuan Shikai dollars - for their daily tael/dollar exchange rate quotations rather than 
foreign silver dollars.  Chinese silver dollars began to spread rapidly as, according to a survey 
in 1924, out of 960 million silver dollars in circulation, 750 million were Yuan Shikai dollars 
and only 30 million were foreign silver dollars (Kuroda 2005, p.114).  Overtime, with the use 
of silver dollars converging towards the Yuan Shikai silver dollar, there emerged a trend 
towards a single silver dollar standard (delinked from the silver tael) (Ma 2013).  As the 
decades proceeded, silver dollars were gradually replacing silver taels as a medium of 
exchange even in rural areas. The successful adoption of a domestic minted currency greatly 
enhanced the flexibility of money supply and transparency of currency exchange. New 
research reveal rapid improvement in monetary integration as measured by the convergence 
of dollars versus tael exchange rates across major urban centers and sharp fall in sessional 
fluctuation precisely from 1916 onward (Ma and Zhao in progress).  
An even more critical development is the rise of modern banking. In the dying years of 
the empire, Qing recognized the glaring absence and critical importance of modern banks. 
The first state-sponsored bank, the Imperial Bank of China, established in 1897, followed the 
model and regulations of HSBC.  The Imperial Bank later morphed into the Bank of China, 
along with the Bank of Communication, were to form the two most important governmental 
banks.  By 1911, China also saw the establishment of 17 other private commercial banks 
(Chen 2003, chapter one).  
In 1916, confronted with a major fiscal crisis, the nascent Republican government in 
Beijing, resorted to the printing press for fiscal revenue and ordered the government banks, 
namely Bank of China and Bank of Communications to suspend paper note conversion to 
silver, a move that was to bring panic and ruins to financial sectors throughout China.  Given 
these were governmental banks, bank managers who dared to resist the governmental order 
could be dismissed or replaced. To avert a potential financial crisis, the Bank of China 
Shanghai Branch managers, after consulting with the Judges of the Mixed Court, instructed 
several shareholders and depositors to file a symbolic law suit against the bank. The suit itself 
                                                 
11
 The safeguard was institutionalized with the establishment of relatively independent silver assaying 
bureaus (公估局) across major commercial cities in China, with Shanghai again leading the way. These 
bureaus or offices, established from the late 19
th
 century, supported by local commercial guilds, 
banking communities, or local and regional governments, were instrumental in setting up and 
upholding the local standard of silver tael (Ma 2013)    
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would bar the Chinese government from removing the managers who were pending a verdict 
by the Mixed Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the International Settlement (Chen 
2003, p. 57).  The outcome is that the Shanghai branch of Bank of China along with other 
Western banks in the International Settlement maintained full convertibility throughout the 
note suspension period while other governmental banks had to accede to the order and suffer 
the devastating bank-runs. 1916 marked a turning point when Shanghai – eclipsing Beijing - 
was to emerge as China’s most important financial center. Subsequently, the Shanghai 
bankers were to play a leadership role in the privatization of these two government state 
banks by revising the bank bylaws, enhancing the influence of private shareholders over 
governmental control (Chen 2003, p. 59-62).  The shift of these quasi-public banking 
institutions almost all of which located in foreign concession areas of large treaty ports, 
towards autonomy and independence from political interference during the entire Warlord era 
was critical for the growth of modern banking and monetary system in China.  
 
3. China Maritime Customs, Public Debt and the Financial Revolution. 
The second key institution - China Maritime Customs – had similar origin and trajectory to 
that of the Shanghai International Settlement and treaty ports. The low fixed tariffs imposed 
by the unequal treaties on China by Western powers were initially collected by Chinese 
customs officials. But when Taiping Rebellion disrupted the function of Chinese customs 
agencies, foreign consuls set up the China Maritime Customs in Shanghai in 1854 to oversee 
the collection of maritime trade taxes that would have otherwise gone unpaid.  Although an 
Imperial Chinese organization in name, the Customs became largely autonomous from the 
Chinese government with Britons dominating the foreign staff of the Customs, followed by 
large numbers of German, U.S., French, and later Japanese staff amongst others. Promotion of 
Chinese nationals into senior positions only started in 1929. (Hans van den ven 2014). 
Its responsibilities soon grew to include domestic customs administration, postal 
administration, harbor and waterway management, weather reporting, and anti-smuggling 
operations. The Service published monthly Returns of Trade, a regular series of Aids to 
Navigation and reports on weather and medical matters. It also represented China at over 
twenty world fairs and exhibition, ran some educational establishments, and conducted some 
diplomatic activities. With over 20,000 people in forty main Customs Houses across China 
and many more subsidiary stations, it was rapidly evolving to become China’s first 
centralized hierarchic bureaucracy when China herself was descending into political 
disintegration.
12
 The autonomy, efficiency and probity of the Chinese Maritime Customs was 
                                                 
12 Its outposts had ironically served China’s only visible administration in far outlying regions such as 
Tibet and Xinjiang, where the Nationalist government had yet to exert any form of actual political 
control, see van den En 2014. 
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to have long-lasting influence on the Chinese economy. Even under the Nanjing regime, the 
Customs maintained a certain degree of autonomy, in fact, in many cases, provided an 
administrative model of efficiency, transparency and political neutrality for the Nanjing 
government’s organization of its own Ministry of Finance (Strauss 1998, chapter 3). 
Like the International Settlement, the second critical phase for Maritime Customs came 
in 1911 when Qing collapsed. Prior to 1911, the Customs exercised no direct control over the 
tariff revenue collected but rather to only conduct accurate assessment and accounting of the 
Customs dues and duties collected at various treaty ports. The actual collecting, banking, and 
remitting of the Customs revenue had been arranged at each port by the Chinese super-
intendant (Wright, p. 1).  With the collapse of Qing and the impending threat to the security of 
revenue often pledged as security for governmental debt, the Maritime Customs effectively 
took over the collection of the Customs revenue and the remittance of the net revenue through 
negotiation with imperial powers. This development became critical for the subsequent 
transformation of Chinese public finance.  
In traditional China, the nature of an absolutist political regime with unquestioned rights 
over all properties and people posed a fundamental dilemma to any form of formalized public 
debt. Indeed, in an ideology “everything under the heaven belongs to emperor”, governmental 
“borrowing” or “repayment” is even conceptually difficult let alone credible (Chen 2003, 
106). In Chinese dynastic histories, the piling up of debt by a dynasty was regarded as symbol 
of bad rule and the portent of a dynasty’s end (Van de ven, 2014, p. 136). De-facto 
“borrowing” did happen but often in the form of extortion, forced contribution, selling of 
offices and status to a small circle of bureaucrats and merchant elites (Ma 2014). Even during 
the second half of the 19
th
 century domestic public borrowing used to expenditure to quell 
rebellion and pay off massive war indemnity owed to foreign governments quickly lost 
credibility and deteriorated into forced contributions and extraction on Chinese wealthy elites 
(van de ven 2014, chapter 4).   
While Chinese government’s commitment to repay foreign public debts was more often 
enforced by the coercive power of Western gunboats, a foreign market for Chinese public 
debts truly rose through the important intermediary institution of China Maritime Customs, 
the agency relatively insulted from the threat of the Chinese imperial government.
13
 When in 
1911, the Maritime Customs directly took over the collection and remittance of the Customs 
revenue and opened an account with HSBC which eventually became the custodian bank of 
that portion of Customs revenue pledged as security for the service of the governmental 
foreign debt, it laid the institutional foundation for a viable market Chinese public debt.
14
  It 
                                                 
13 For the rise of a foreign market for Chinese public debt, see Van de ven, chapter 4.  
14 Initially, two other banks, Russo-Asiatische Bank and Deutsch-Asiatische Bank also served as the 
Custodian banks. They relinquished their roles following German defeat in WWI and subsequent rise 
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was this arrangement, as argued by Stanley Wright, that “China, since the outbreak of the 
(1911) Revolution, not only kept faith with thousands of her foreign bondholders throughout 
the world, but also to some extent held in check the disruptive forces set loose by the 
Revolution” (p. 9).  
This institutional mechanism was soon to become the cornerstone for a domestic market 
for Chinese governmental bonds handled through large Chinese public banks who have, as we 
see earlier, won independence from the 1910s. When the Beijing government set up a 
relatively independent National Loan Bureau (内国公债局) in 1914 composed of Chinese 
and Western Bankers and Maritime Customs officials, it is a wholesale borrowing of a full 
Western practise ranging from accounting to repayment procedures; or as is literally, it needs 
to be “draped in a Western dress” in order to achieve credibility (Okamoto 1999, p. 381-2).  
The key practise was for the Bureau to ensure that tax revenue earmarked for debt repayment 
be directly remitted to special revenue account set up in the Western banks and later to 
Chinese banks. After weathering the fiscal crisis and the banknote suspension incident in 
1916, the original mechanism instituted for public debt repayment came back. Given his veto 
power over its borrowing, Frances Algen, the new Maritime Customs Inspector General, was 
in effective control. Algen had lost trust in the Beijing government given her history of 
raiding Chinese banks for fiscal reasons. From the 1920s, through combined efforts of 
Bankers’ association in both Shanghai and Beijing, Chinese Banks such as Bank of China and 
Bank of Communications began to play increasingly important role in the operation of public 
debt anchored on the National Loan Bureau, where all relevant tax revenue (including 
Maritime Customs) earmarked for the servicing of public debt were placed in the 
custodianship of the Maritime Customs. This led to the rise of an unusual alliance between 
the Bankers – Chinese or Western – and the China Maritime Customs (Yan Hongzhong 2015, 
Okamato 1999, chapter 7 Van de ven chapter 5).  
 Initially, the Nationalist government, even before 1927 when she established her 
capital in Nanjing, regularly resorted to forced loans or extortions on wealthy banking and 
industrial elites for its fiscal needs (see Parks Coble Jr. 1980, p. 35-36 and p. 43-46). From 
1928 onward, the new finance minister, T.V. Song, began a policy of cooperation with 
Shanghai bankers and took over some of the good practices initiated in the Beiyang decade to 
create a genuine market for government bonds and securities. Indeed, Zhang Jia’o, the 
Shanghai Banker who had orchestrated the privatization of the main governmental Banks in 
Shanghai following the 1916 Bank note suspension incident, was said to have admonished 
Mr. Song that the Nationalist government is better off “establishing the reputation of 
governmental debt than constantly pressuring the bankers for monetary advance” (Jiang 2003, 
                                                                                                                                            
of Soviet Union. Wright, p. 9. For details of this institutional arrangement and banking consortium 
before WWI, also see Okamoto, pp.376-380 and Van de ven, chapter 4.  
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pp.236-7).  To convince investors of the safety of governmental bonds, each issue was 
secured on income from a tax source, the most important of which is the Customs revenue. 
Payments to the bondholders were handled by the Sinking Fund Commission (国库基金保管
委员会), which was headed by a private banker and with nine representatives from the 
Shanghai banking community and five from the government (Coble Jr., 1980, p. 72-3). Each 
month, the Inspector General of Maritime Customs transferred funds directly to the board of 
trustees to cover payments secured on the customs revenue while payments secured on other 
tax revenue were held by the Shanghai Bankers’ Association (Coble Jr, 1980, p. 70-78, Wright 
1935, chapter one).   
Under this institutional arrangement, Shanghai banks became the largest holder of 
government bonds, holding somewhere between one half to two thirds of Nanjing government 
bonds at the end of 1931 (Coble JR, p. 74). In fact, governmental bonds became the main 
portfolio among Chinese banks in Shanghai in general, far outweighing the share going to 
finance private enterprise (Yan Hongzhong 2015). The successful floatation of government 
bonds spawned an active primary and secondary market. Although stock exchanges were 
established in Beijing and Shanghai from 1918 and 1920 respectively, the bulk of the trading 
of Shanghai Stock Exchange was in governmental bonds which occupied a staggering share 
of 98% with only 2% in corporate shares and bonds (Yan Hongzhong 2015, p. 116; Coble, p 
75-76). Overall, the amount of domestic debts issued in 1927-1931 was nearly the double the 
amount issued during the entire Beiyang era of 1912-1926. While in the Beiyang era, the 
share of domestic to foreign public debt was 1 to 7, it became 6 to 4 in the Nanjing decade of 
1927-36.15 This marked perhaps the first time in Chinese history that the Chinese government 
could tap into the wealth of Chinese elites or even average people for borrowing without the 
usual coercion and predation. 
 An important consequence of banks’ increased holding of securitized governmental 
bonds -long misunderstood or neglected – is the rapid increase in the bank’s capacity to 
increase its issue of bank notes and augment lending capacity. China’s banking regulations 
allowed modern banks to use securities – which were composed of mostly governmental 
bonds – in the range of 40% to serve as reserves for bank notes (Brand and Sargent 1989, 
p.40). Hence, the credibility of governmental bonds and the functioning of the Sinking Fund 
became a critical barometer for the reputation of banknotes issued by both public and private 
banks and to certain degree the entire banking sector.  Indeed, the bond market often followed 
the vicissitudes of the various phases of bargaining between the government and bankers over 
                                                 
15 Similarly, while foreign and domestic debts accounted for about 21% and 3.4% of total governmental 
revenue respectively in the Beiyang era, they were about 4% and 27% respectively, see Yan 
Hongzhong 2015, pp. 111-112. 
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the control of fiscal revenue and sink fund.
16
 In an insightful paper, Brandt and Sargent (1989) 
invoked the so-called real bills doctrine to explain the close connection between growth in 
governmental bonds and money supply for this period. They argued that the governmental 
bond can qualify as a “real bill” as long as there is a firm prospect that sufficient future taxes 
will be levied to service the debt. With the two major sources being revenue from the 
Maritime Customs and Salt Taxes, these conditions - certainly before the monetary reform of 
1935 - seemed to have been regularly met with both principal and interest payments of 
various domestic loans having been regularly paid, usually leaving ample balances in the 
hands of the Sinking Fund Commission (Brandt and Sargent 1989).  
Their observation is borne out in Figure 1 which shows that while total species as 
measured by silver bullion, dollars and copper cash barely registered any increase during 
1911-1936, total money supply (M1) which includes species increased at an annual rate of 5% 
between 1911-16 and 1931-36. This is only possible because the bank notes and deposit 
components of M1 surged at a remarkable annual rate of 9.5% during the same period. As a 
result, the estimated share of notes and deposits in M1 money supply rose from 22.3–34.6 
percent in 1910 to a minimum of 40.4 percent in 1925 and 83.2 percent in 1936 (Rawski 1989, 
p. 157).  As observed in Figure 1, the turning point marked by an uptick in M1 around 1917-
18 corresponds closely to the timing of institutional triumph of Chinese modern banks and the 
subsequent development of Chinese domestic public debt throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
Overall Chinese banks - mostly Modern but also including Native Banks - accounted for the 
lion share of the growth in this period. The deposits held by Chinese Banks relative to foreign 
banks increased from about two times in the 1910s to about four in 1930-35. The same ratio 
for banknotes held by Chinese over foreign banks increased from 1.5 times to about 3 times 
for the same period (calculated from Rawski, Table C.15, p. 392).
17
   
The diffusion of banknotes also accelerated with the innovative arrangements where 
large note-issuing banks such as Bank of China and Bank of Communications offered their 
banknotes in exchange for cash and government bonds supplied by smaller financial 
institutions especially Native Banks (Ma 2013). Further, the expansion of branch networks 
allowed major domestic banks to “attract deposits from all regions and recycle them to the 
areas of greatest demand,” contributing to the emergence of an embryonic national market for 
                                                 
16 See Coble Jr. 1980, pp. 90-108, Jiang 2003, Wright, 1935. In particular, see Ma and Yao 2014 on the 
details of three major debt restructuring in 1921, 1932 and 1936.  
17 These figures are consistent with the so-called “capital power” measure used by Chen Linshen which 
includes notes and deposits plus capital of the bank. It shows that the share of Modern Banks as 
measured capital power went from zero in 1894 to 41% and 78% respectively 1925 and 1936 relative 
to the share for Foreign banks which went from 33% to 37% and 12%. Overall, the capital of a modern 
Chinese banking sector multiplied at an annual rate of 10.2% between 1897 and 1936 (p. 241). For a 
statistical test on the co-movement of public debts, bank capital and trading volume of stock 
exchanges, see Yan Hongzhong 2015. 
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funds. In the mid-1930s, there were about 160 modern domestic banks in China with over 
1300 branches in over 500 localities (Brandt and Sargent 1989, 40; Rawski 1989, pp. 136, 
152). The widespread diffusion of convertible banknotes issued by multiple public and private 
banks, Chinese or foreign, based on reputation mechanism have led to the triumph of what 
Denzer-Speck (2009) called a Chinese version of free banking in the Republican period. With 
the minting and diffusion of a new domestic silver coin from the late 1910s onward, 
Republican China in these three decades had seen the rise of an genuine Silver standard and 
nothing short of a financial revolution, ironically, in an era of national disintegration. In 1933, 
when the Nanjing-based government established a single monetary standard based on the 
silver dollar, this major advance in the monetary system was built on the achievements of two 
decades of monetary and financial advances. 
Figure 1 Species and Money Supply in China in 1911-1936 (in Million Yuan) 
 
Notes: M1 is equal to species plus bank notes and deposits. Bank notes, Silver, Copper currency from 
Minami and Makino 2014, Table. 5.2.1. Bank deposits data from Rawski 1989, Table c.16, p. 394. 
 
Despite the tripling of money supply total but GDP growth during this period 
possibly no more than two per cent per annum between the 1910s and 1930s, the price level 
overall remained stable indicating an increasing monetization for a growing economy 
(Denzer-Speck 2009, for GDP data, see Rawski, p. 330). The Chinese economy in the early 
20
th
 century had a medium of exchange that is liquid, convenient to carry, easy to count and 
credible, features far superior to traditional currencies which may be poor in quality or quasi 
16 
 
currencies such as silver tael that require constant monitoring in weight and fineness. 
Monetary transformation in the form of increased liquidity generated economy wide 
externalities by reducing transaction costs, promoting commercialization and supplying 
capital for financing industrial, commercial agrarian ventures throughout China.
18   
 
Conclusion 
My narrative on the 20th century China offers some revealing insights on the development 
or lack thereof monetary and financial institution, an issue which have received insufficient 
attention in the current Great Divergence debate. I show here that the stationary banditry 
equilibrium along with ruler’s unconstrained and arbitrary power in the traditional Chinese 
political regime was insufficient to sustain the rise of a formal and viable market for public 
debt which in turn may have partly accounted for overall relative underdevelopment of formal 
financial institution and market in traditional China.19  Hence, our findings contribute to the 
ongoing debate on state capacity and Great Divergence. 
The rise of constitutionalism and parliamentarianism in the 1910s, which aimed at 
correcting the shortfalls of the traditional regimes by bringing about constitutional constraint 
on the rulers, may have instead partly caused the collapse of the state. The state whose power 
had once been too intrusive to the security of property rights and contract enforcement had 
then become too weak to protect them. What arose as an imperfect substitute is a set of new 
institutions - namely the International Settlement and China Maritime Customs - that had 
grown outside China’s imperial regime to offer some limited form of credible commitment to 
formal property rights and contract enforcement particularly in public debt repayment. These 
institutions, though fundamentally Western and colonial, had nonetheless inspired the 
imagination of enlightened Chinese entrepreneurs and officials who took advantage of them 
to engineer a genuine financial revolution in early 20th century China. In a sharp departure 
from the traditional political regime where credibility was placed at the mercy or benevolence 
of a strong and stable state, this particular institutional mechanism actually placed the burden  
on a quasi-political structure that had grown autonomous from the central government. 
Interestingly, while constitutionalism may have failed at the national parliament, Chinese 
bankers and bondholders who enjoyed some form of security of property rights under this 
institutional mechanism, have for the first time in Chinese history, attempted at numerous 
occasions to place constraint on the power of the government with regards to fiscal spending 
(Coble Jr., 49-57 and 115-125). 
                                                 
18 See O’Brien and Palma’s recent work showing similar financial revolution emanated from Bank of 
England in England’s post-Glorious Revolution era.  
19  For an alternative view that relative absence of warfare in China accounting for the lack of 
development in public debt, see Rosenthal and Wong, 2011, chapters 4 and 5.  
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My narrative on the institutional origin of this financial revolution offers unique lessons 
to long-term economic change in China. Both the Settlement and Maritime Customs gained 
strength at similar junctures by taking advantage of Chinese imperial weakness. As semi-
colonial institutions, both organizations are rife with Western racism in their exclusion of 
Chinese elites at least initially. Ironically, it was possibly the mystique of racism or Western 
supremacy that initially supplied these institutions some form of autonomy from the intrusion 
of imperial Chinese government. But racism is two-edge sword. The nationalist resentment 
against imperialism and political disintegration fed into a rising sentiment for political re-
centralization that partially led to the success of a Nationalist regime reinvigorated by Soviet 
military aid and party discipline in 1925-27. The founding of an authoritarian regime in 
Nanjing in 1928 marks the end of China’s short-lived experiment with constitutionalism and 
the beginning of a move to rein in the autonomous power of Western treaty ports, Chinese 
bankers and China Maritime Customs from the 1930s. As part of power consolidation, the 
Nationalist government effectively nationalized major banks in 1935. By removing the one-
time check against potential fiscal abuse by the government, it also created conditions for the 
rise of hyper-inflation in the 1940s, possibly the onset of totalitarianism under the Communist 
ideologies (Coble Jr., 1980, chapters seven and eight, Friedman 1992, Brandt and Sargent 
1989). Hence, nationalism became a two-edge sword. 
Our narrative also reveals the dilemma of political and economic reform examined from 
the longue duree of Chinese history. A perennial theme throughout two millennia of Chinese 
history is the enduring stability of centralized and unitary imperial rule punctured only by 
episodic political collapse before regrouping towards the next phase of stable unitary imperial 
rule (Ma 2011). It was often in those brief moments of collapse that large ideological shift - 
made possible by the introduction of new ideas - occurred before converging towards a new 
synthesis of a ruling ideology. In many ways, the period of 1900-1937 represents such a 
temporary moment of suspension from a unitary state, which allowed the massive infusion of 
institutions and ideologies usually from outside. But often a unitary state had to be re-
established in order to stem the collapse often at the expense of stifling future institutional 
innovation. With the Chinese political regime returning to her centralizing and authoritarian 
tradition from the 1940s onward, the economic and financial record during this early 20th 
century Republican experiment offers us a rare glimpse of what an alternative or innovative 
China could have or could not have accomplished if just temporarily freed from the shackles 
of unity and centralization.  
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